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Abstract
The ability of researchers to raise funding is central to academic achievement. However, 
whether success in obtaining research funds correlates with the productivity, quality or 
impact of a researcher is debated. Here we analyse 10 years of grant funding by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation in Earth and Environmental Sciences, and compare it to the 
publication record of the researchers who were awarded the funds. No significant statisti-
cal correlation can be established between the publication or citation record of a researcher 
and the amount of money this researcher obtains in grant funding. These results imply that 
researchers successful in raising funds are not necessarily in a position to be more produc-
tive or produce more impactful publications. Those results should be considered for decid-
ing whether to use grant funding as a criterion for career advancement procedures.
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Attracting research funding is a central aspect of academic achievement. Researchers 
write and submit proposals, which are peer-reviewed so that panels can evaluate the qual-
ity, potential impact, relevance and innovation of the proposed work. It is also essential 
that researchers have the qualifications to conduct the proposed research. On that basis, 
one may thus intuitively think that scientists who can write an excellent research proposal 
are more likely to produce excellent publications. As a matter of fact, funding attribution 
based on past scientific success is often advocated (Gross and Bergstrom 2019). Scientists 
work hard on their research, in the hope that creative ideas and well-thought protocols will 
be reflected in their publication record, which in turn will enable them to secure future 
research funds. This vision is widely shared today by recruitment, tenure and promotion 
committees, which consider grant success as a good selection criterion.
Here we investigate whether successful funding correlates with research productivity or 
impact using grant outcome data of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) Divi-
sion II projects in Earth and Environmental sciences. We focus on a single discipline to 
have a homogeneous population of researchers with similar excellence criteria. This fund-
ing scheme is ideal for such an analysis because the eligibility requirements are broad, 
the main criterion being that a given individual can hold a maximum of two projects at 
the same time as main Principal Investgator (PI). It is designed as the workhorse of Swiss 
research funding, with a yearly budget of about CHF500 mio and the aim of supporting all 
scientific areas, and a high success rate of about 50%. It can therefore be assumed that most 
established researchers regularly submit such projects. The proposal guidelines specify that 
the evaluations are based on two main criteria (Swiss National Science Foundation 2016): 
(1) the scientific quality of the proposed research project: scientific relevance, topicality 
and originality, suitability of methods, feasibility; (2) the scientific qualifications of the 
researchers: scientific track record and ability to conduct the proposed research. Evaluation 
is based on a peer-reviewed system. Members of the panel then assess the proposal and the 
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reviews, propose a ranking and decide on whether funding should be awarded or not. Pan-
els include established scientists of diverse disciplines.
Here we analyse funding outcomes of SNSF division II projects that have been awarded 
during the last ten years in Earth Sciences and Environmental Sciences (data available pub-
licly on the P3 database of the SNSF http://p3.snf.ch). For each researcher working in a 
Swiss university or research institution who has obtained at least one grant in these disci-
plines and this period, we record how much funding was secured and how many years the 
person was eligible for funding. Only researchers who obtained more than CHF1000/year 
in average over the last ten years are considered, resulting in a population of 317 research-
ers. For the same pool of researchers, we also analyse the publication and citation record 
as inventoried in the Scopus database (www.scopu s.com), using a series of metrics. We 
consider both raw metrics and metrics normalized by the academic age of the researcher, 
which is defined as the number of years since the first paper (Table 1). These include the 
total number of published papers, number of citations, number of first-author highly cited 
papers, the H-index (Hirsch 2005), as well as these four quantities divided by the academic 
age of the researcher. It should be noted here that normalized metrics allow filtering out 
career stage-related biases. As such, they may better reflect research impact, such as the 
M-quotient (the H-index divided by the number of years since first paper), and the fre-
quency of highly cited papers as first author (defined as having over 100 citations). We 
would like to acknowledge that these metrics do not necessarily reflect the quality of the 
research produced or the excellence of researchers, as it will vary from one discipline to 
another. However, one may expect that a well-funded scientist is likely to be more produc-
tive on average than one that is not.
The results of our analysis are displayed in Fig. 1 as scatter-plots between publication 
metrics and funding outcomes. Each dot represents one of the 317 researchers considered. 
Correlations of each quantitative research metric with 10-year average grant income are 
indicated as  R2 values for each plot, along with the 5% and 95% confidence intervals of 
R estimated by a bootstrapping procedure (10′000 samples). Note that all variables except 
the year of the first published paper are log-normally distributed (see supplementary). We 
therefore use their decimal logarithms to estimate correlations. The distributions of the var-
iables and the untransformed data are available in supplementary material.
The correlations found are surprisingly low, but this is consistent with studies in other 
disciplines, notably medicine (Jacob and Lefgren 2011). The stronger relationships found 
in Fig. 1, albeit weak, are with non-normalized metrics that typically increase monoton-
ically with the age of the researcher: the year of the first published paper, the H-index, 
the total number of citations and the total number of published papers  (R2 in the range 
0.12–0.14). These indicate a weak tendency of slightly more money going to older and 
Table 1  Quantitative metrics of research output used in this study
Raw metrics Normalized metrics
Total number of published papers Number of papers per year since the year of first paper
Total number of citations Number of citations per year since the year of first paper
H-index M-quotient (H-index divided by the number of years 
since publication of first paper)
Total number of highly cited papers (defined as a 
first-author paper with over 100 citations as of 
1 December 2019)
Total number of highly cited articles per year since the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































more established researchers. However, the most notable finding of this analysis is the 
absence of a correlation with the M-quotient  (R2 = 0.079) and the rate of highly cited paper 
 (R2 = 0.0074), indices considered to reflect impactful contributions and used in previous 
studies (Nicholson and Ioannidis 2012). Like many funding bodies, the SNSF adheres to 
the DORA declaration (https ://sfdor a.org) stating that publications and citations numbers 
alone are largely insufficient and questionable to characterize one’s research quality. How-
ever, most researchers would expect some relationship between these metrics and grant 
funding because those should reflect, even very imperfectly, a researcher’s ability to have 
ideas and convert them in impactful research. One may argue that the SNSF panels are 
wise enough to nuance the value of a publication record in the light of more fundamental 
scientific advances that are not necessarily highly cited. However, this argument does not 
hold when we consider that the basis of project funding is an expected correlation between 
the excellence of proposals and the expected impact of the research outcomes, which is 
one of the criteria to award funding. Furthermore, the nuancing ability of the panels can 
be questioned because in our analysis, raw metrics are more correlated to funding than 
normalized ones, despite being known to be misleading criteria of research excellence (The 
PLoS Medicine Editors 2006).
Our data also indicates that panel members are awarded in average 2.2 times more fund-
ing than other scientists (based on only 7 researchers in our analysis who are also panel 
members). This does not necessary mean that panel members are systematically favoured 
in the evaluation: panel members are typically selected among already well-funded 
researchers, and moreover conflict-of-interest regulations are strictly enforced at the SNSF. 
However, this may be an indication of a bias towards funding more senior researchers, 
which is also shown by a statistically significant correlation between funding and age, as 
panel members are typically more established researchers. Furthermore, it may raise ques-
tions about a system that particularly reinforces seniority biases.
The main limitation of our analysis is that data on rejected grants is not available. The 
assumption we make here is that researchers who were less funded did submit projects 
which were subsequently rejected. While we cannot validate this assumption, it is likely 
true because the broad eligibility requirements, the absence of restrictions on resubmission 
and the high success rates mean that there is little rationale for a researcher not to apply 
for funding over a 10-year period. Furthermore, we only consider researchers that were 
funded at least once with this scheme, and who are therefore fully aware of the opportuni-
ties offered.
At this stage, we can only speculate on the cause of this lack of correlation. Fortunately, 
we did not observe any gender bias, as the average funding per year is very similar for 
researchers of both genders (CHF 66′084/year for females and CHF 65′264/year for males). 
Another hypothesis to explain the seemingly random distribution of funding is that of an 
effort to avoid possible biases, such as gender bias, institution bias, sub-discipline bias 
(Severin et  al. 2019). If the elimination of those multiple biases dominates the selection 
criteria, it may come at the detriment of other criteria such as scientific excellence or value.
In the absence of a definitive explanation, the data seem to indicate that the SNSF Divi-
sion II project funding scheme acts in a manner equivalent to a random lottery with regard 
to track record. Funding according to lottery systems have been advocated in the past 
(Adam 2019; Ioannidis 2011) and have been implemented in some instances (Liu et  al. 
2020), particularly for projects that have passed a first selection threshold. If the outcome 
of a careful evaluation of projects were equivalent to a random draw, a lottery would pre-
sent the advantages of saving considerable time and energy preparing and assessing grants, 
as well as an easy way of avoiding biases of gender, age or discipline. We acknowledge that 
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the Swiss research landscape is of a high level in international comparison (Laverde-Rojas 
and Correa 2019), indicating that their evaluation system results in positive incentives and 
positive research outcomes. As we discuss below, the present analysis emphasises, above 
all, the need to clarify the evaluation criteria of the SNSF and of funding bodies in general.
From the point of view of the funding body, if the intention is only to fund excellent 
projects regardless of the applicant, a transparent alternative to the current evaluation sys-
tem would be to entirely disregard track records by making the applications anonymous 
(a step in this direction has been taken by the SNSF with the introduction of the SPARK 
pilot funding scheme). Such a strategy can be called project-based evaluation philosophy. 
However, if the intention is to fund excellent scientists and reward them, the track record 
of the applicants should be taken into account. One solution could be to design evaluation 
criteria that consider the past achievements of researchers, and also to reinforce mecha-
nisms that build on the delivery of results following previously funded projects. This could 
then be termed a career-based evaluation philosophy. Importantly in such a system, crite-
ria should equally apply to proposals submitted by evaluation panel members themselves, 
whose larger funding could otherwise be perceived as undue compensation – especially 
considering that their work in the panel is already remunerated.
In the authors’ experience, academic evaluation procedures (i.e., hiring, tenure, or aca-
demic kudos, which can be seen as the “carrot” motivating scientists) put a lot of empha-
sis on the researchers’ ability to raise funding. This is based on the perception that many 
funding agencies have made the choice of a career-based evaluation strategy. However, our 
analysis seems to contradict this perception, showing that the SNSF has here opted for a 
project-based evaluation philosophy. Indeed, some researchers have benefitted from high 
levels of funding over the last 10 years without many citations, high-impact or numerous 
papers. In writing this, we are conscious of the multiple limitations of an analysis based on 
metrics. We fully support the principles stated in the DORA initiative, however it seems 
that here the attribution of funds goes further than DORA in the direction of a project-
based philosophy by apparently ignoring the publication record of researchers.
Our main concern is that the attribution philosophy of the SNSF and funding bodies in 
general, either project-based or career-based, is often not well known amongst research-
ers and career evaluation committees in universities. Funding outcomes have a significant 
impact on the perception of one’s research qualities and performance, because of a frequent 
assumption that the funding evaluation criteria are career-based. We find urgent to correct 
this perception. While the scheme analysed here clearly uses a project-based philosophy 
(the outcomes of projects are not significantly correlated to scientific productivity), its out-
comes are often used as criteria for hiring decisions. We recommend that funding bodies 
transparently position themselves as either project-based or career-based, and clearly com-
municate in those terms. Analyses such as the one presented in this paper should be carried 
out broadly by funding agencies to determine which incentives they create among scientists 
and the institutions that hire them. A lack of clarity in the philosophy adopted may lead to 
possible unintended and undesirable consequences, such as career advancement based on 
lottery outcomes.
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